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Emerging Economies: Setting a Research Agenda 
 
Birud Sindhav               
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Email: bsindhav@unomaha.edu 
 
Abstract 
The story of the growth of emerging economies is about the growth of their marketing 
institutions. Marketing channels are the key marketing institution in enabling the flow of 
goods and services. However, marketing scholars typically rely on models and theories 
devised in the developed economies to study the marketing channels in emerging 
economies, and these include theories based on political economy-based frameworks that 
emphasize power and dependence. We argue that often the institutional drives to gain 
legitimacy provide a powerful lens to understand the evolution of marketing channels. In 
this conceptual paper, we illustrate our arguments through a few examples, and provide an 
agenda for future research. 
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Introduction 
Emerging economies are often characterized by their relatively higher and sustainable 
growth rates. The attendant economic conditions usually include increase in productivity 
and GDP at rates higher than those in the developed economies. These developments affect 
many facets of economy. For example, the increased variety and flow of goods and services 
result in the development and evolution of marketing channels.  
 
This is an expected outcome because growing economy and the increase in consumption go 
hand in hand and the marketing channels are made of interdependent organizations 
(channel members) that link the marketer with the end consumer. Wholesalers, agents,  
brokers, insurers, retailers, warehouses, transporters, specialized delivery vehicles, road, 
rail, ports, waterways, and the electronic data network – these all are vital ingredients of a 
marketing channel system that keeps the economy humming.  
 
Despite the central role of marketing channels (or simply “channels”) in connecting the 
marketers and consumers, surprisingly little attention is paid to understanding how 
marketing channels evolve in emerging economies and if the dominant frameworks and 
model used to understand the channels in developed economies are appropriate in 
understanding the evolution of channels in emerging economies. Usually, the models from 
the mature economies are deemed relevant for the emerging economies as well (e.g., Dong, 
Tse, and Hung 2010; Kale 1986). It is our thesis that the neoclassical theory based efficiency 
centered framework or the political economy-based models, the dominant theoretical 
frameworks through which the functioning of channels is examined in developed markets, 
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do an incomplete job of explaining the functioning and evolution of channels in emerging 
economies.  
 
In the developed economies, the marketing channels are sophisticated in nature as they 
serve a mature economy. Following the lead of other social scientists, the efforts to 
understand the marketing channels traditionally have been rooted into the neoclassical 
framework where efficiency is the goal and transactions happen without frictions and 
information is ubiquitous. Since these assumptions do not reflect real life conditions, 
scholars adopted the political economy framework where the economic actions are steeped 
into political concerns of power and dependence (e.g., Frazier and Summers 1986). The 
dominant themes in the literature addressing channel concerns have been governance 
mechanisms (Yang, Su, and Fam 2012), agency relationships (Vermillion, Lassar, and Winsor 
2002), power equations among channel members (Frazier 1983), various types of influence 
attempts they bring in to achieve the desired outcomes (Scheer and Stern 1992), and the 
relational bonds they establish with each other (Zhuang and Xubing 2011).  
 
All these issues are vital in capturing the nature of a marketing channel from various angles, 
however, we argue that they miss an important piece of the puzzle – how various 
institutions within the society shape the evolution of the marketing channels. The 
institutional view examines the dynamics of marketing channels as the channel 
development gets informed by the constraints put on it by various institutions (Grewal and 
Dharwadkar 2002; Varman and Costa 2009; Yang, Su, and Fam 2012). This view looks at 
market development “as a political and social process…as a process of legitimation” 
(Humphreys 2010). Our aim is to highlight the kinds of issues related to marketing channels 
to be explored through further conceptual and empirical studies.   
 
Why Institutional Theory Matters in Examining the Channel in Emerging Economies 
Our context of emerging economies does not mean that institutional theory cannot be 
applied in the developed economies context. Indeed, the institutional theory has been 
applied in understanding the marketing organizations in developed economies as well (e.g., 
McFarland, Bloodgood, and Payan 2008).  Further, the “recurrence of earlier patterns” and 
studying “inter-institutional strife” have often remained the focus of the investigation 
(Brown 1987).  
 
While the usefulness of the institutional theory is highlighted when it comes to 
understanding change in economic environment (e.g., Scott 2004), there is still need for a 
bit detailed discussion. The channels are made of dyads and the neoclassical theory assumes 
frictionless transactions. In reality, transactions are fraught with uncertainty and mediated 
through various institutions designed to reduce this uncertainty (North 1991). If we take an 
example of a remote rural community in an emerging country like India, a farmer may 
provide vegetables to end consumers in the local community in cash- or barter-based 
transactions. This is the simplest and shortest form of marketing channel, where the 
transaction is personal in nature. It is most likely that the buyer and the seller know each 
other and have engaged in repeated transactions in the past. The presence of the 
interpersonal trust suffices in enabling the transaction.  
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However, as the economy grows, it is characterized by specialization of actors and division 
of labor. The mass production means the production and consumption are separated 
geographically, setting the stage for introducing more actors in the marketing channels (e.g., 
regional distributors) and making the transactions impersonal in nature. The impossibility of 
knowing everyone involved in the channel personally means the interpersonal trust is not a 
viable mechanism to reduce the uncertainty in the transaction (e.g., the quality of products 
may be unknown). Typically, contracts are drawn to reduce the uncertainty about the 
transactions. However, just writing a contract is not enough, as without the threat of 
enforcement, they may remain toothless. Various institutions play role in reducing the 
uncertainty, enforcing the contract if need be, and enabling the transaction. Table 1 
describes the mechanisms employed in enforcing the contracts at various levels of 
complexity in the transactions.  
 
The mediation of transactions by the institutions introduces “friction”, challenging one 
major assumption of the neoclassical frameworks. The political economy-based models take 
into account such “imperfections” in the market, and focus on how constructs such as 
power and negotiations strategies affect the outcomes, including economic ones, of a 
marketing channel. However, in emerging economies, the channels often function within 
extra-economic context.  
 
Examples of Marketing Channels with Extra- Economic Context  
A few of the examples of the marketing/distribution channels with the extra-economic 
context are listed here: 
1. Coarse grain distribution centers are often awarded to needy individuals where 
need-based considerations supersede merit-based considerations. Similar 
considerations are at the heart of the Gramin Bank model, which distributes micro 
loans. The Shakti initiative by HLL has dual bottom lines as they choose 
underprivileged rural females as beneficiaries.  These social welfare expectations 
from a channel are likely to be found more readily in emerging rather than mature 
economies.    
2. Often new marketing channel arrangements are pursued in emerging economies not 
necessarily for its economic feasibility but because it rubs off on the firm in a positive 
manner. Amul was pioneer in adopting the Internet as a marketing channel in its 
goal to be known as an “IT company in the food business”.   
3. The political institutions generally overpower the economic efficiency 
considerations, greatly affecting the type of channels that can evolve in a given 
economy. Further, political willingness to enact laws to allow market-based 
exchanges to flourish (e.g., antitrust laws) and create a powerful judiciary to make 
contracts enforceable is critical in setting a stage for economy to take off. This is 
highlighted by the case of the Latin American countries where they liberally 
borrowed from the constitution of the United States in a hope to mimic its economic 
success. However, the lack of institutions that can make contracts enforceable and 
support private property rights has resulted into dysfunctional economies for the 
better part of the last century (De Soto 2003).  
4. The polity supersedes economics in that the competing interests in politics do not let 
the pure market equilibrium presumed by the neoclassical theory to realize. In India, 
the congress party was defeated even after putting the country to the path of 
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enhanced growth rate. The message - if the fruits of economic growth were not 
enjoyed by all, there will be consequences. This made the political parties to re-
evaluate their stance towards liberalization such as disallowing the FDI in FMCG 
retailing, greatly affecting how marketing channels would have evolved.   
5. The general suboptimal state of physical infrastructure (e.g., investment banking) in 
emerging economies is often compensated by substituting the influence of caste and 
community-based institutions. For example, the great construction boom in many 
parts of India is financed by temples in a transaction between the builder-devotee 
and the religious head that does not always show up on the financial documents.  
6.  Emerging economies are often characterized by “dual economies” of relatively free- 
and the controlled- segments. Within the “controlled segment”, there are about half 
a million Fair Price Shops (FPS) in India, run by the Public Distribution System (PDS). 
The aim of these shops is ensure food security for the poor populace, and therefore, 
efficiency and market forces take a backseat. The institutional theory may be a 
proper tool to understand the functioning of this channel as legitimacy is a more 
immediate concern than efficiency (cf. Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).  
 
The other argument about using institutional theory in understanding the evolution of 
marketing channel in emerging economies comes from the inherent nature of the emerging 
economies – they are usually associated with the lack of competitive structure and disregard 
for efficiency and the preference for the welfare or autocratic state. When the growth path 
is sought, it is through the establishment of market institutions (emphasis added, McMillan 
and Barry 1996). Therefore, understanding the change through institutional theory is an 
appropriate choice.  
 
The Potential Research Agenda 
In light of the issues we highlighted so far, we argue for a greater consideration of the 
context, particularly the immediate institutional environment in examining the marketing 
channels in emerging economies. Society and culture play dominant roles in how we frame 
our sense making endeavors. The neoclassical theory is devoid of accounting for such 
idiosyncrasies, though, it is doubtful if we can simply wish these away as noise.  
 
Further, the national economies are path dependent. Their current bearings are a result of 
the journey made in the past. For example, the escape-from-monarchy ideology, the 
frontier mentality, and the lack of ancient history has provided for a very unique context to 
the American economy compared to the European and the Asian economies.  
 
The post-independence Indian economy is relatively young, but already includes two major 
inflection points. One, immediately after the independence, conscious choice was made to 
be self-sufficient, probably as a response to the just endured slavery to the British. This 
guiding principle led to emulating the socialist structure of the soviet economy, with 
centralized planning as a key feature. The second inflection point came roughly four 
decades later, when in 1991 India had to put aside its national pride and fly gold to London 
to ensure liquidity in the international trade. The resultant liberalization of economy is still 
work in progress. Consequently, our inquiries should take into consideration the evolving 
nature of the economy (and parts of economy such as marketing channels) in framing the 
questions. Some indicative questions are mentioned below: 
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1. As the erstwhile third world countries are reclassified as emerging economies, they 
make transition from the centrally controlled economy to the market-based 
economy. As the public distribution of goods and services get eclipsed by the 
market-based system, what are the implications for the marketing channels in terms 
of how their performance is measured?  
2. What types of formal and informal institutions affect the marketing channels? How? 
Are one type of institutions more like to affect than the other? Why?  
3. Infrastructure development is the backbone of any robust marketing channel. The 
legal and social arrangements affect how the hard infrastructure evolves. The 
adoption of VAT (software) encourages adoption of more efficient hub-and-spoke 
model of warehouses. How does evolving institutional environment affect the 
development of infrastructure?  
4. What are the factors affecting the evolution of the institutional environment for 
marketing channels (e.g., the changing perceptions of the role of the government 
versus private enterprises in creating jobs)? Which factors are more important than 
the others and how do we know that? 
5. Technology is brought in to harvest the productivity gains within 
economy/marketing channels, but that alone is not enough. It is the technology 
nestled within the institutional arrangement to make the impersonal transactions 
possible that sets the stage for the productivity gains. How does technology interact 
with the evolution of the institutions in affecting the channel performance? Would 
M-Pesa like system be possible without the widespread adoption of the wireless 
technology?  
6. How institutional and economics-related factors interact to affect the evolution of 
marketing channels? Chi-Hsing and Kuo (2008) provide a promising start with 
examining the case of a computer manufacturer, however, more robust 
methodology is needed to gain deeper insights.  
 
These issues are illustrative in nature, but do lay out an agenda for understanding the 
unique role of institutional environment in the functioning and evolution of marketing 
channels in emerging economies. While there are some initiatives in marketing to apply 
institutional theory in understanding the evolution and functioning of marketing channels 
(e.g.,  Richey et al 2005), much needs to be done to fully harness the explanatory power if 
this theory.  
 
Conclusion 
Marketing channels interact with the economy in which they reside as a mini system. 
Channel development is a very organic process where the marketers try to devise a best 
way to deliver value to customers within the constraints they have to face. On the other 
hand, they also go beyond these constraints by bringing in new technology, riding on the 
infrastructure development, and implementing the innovations within the system.  This 
constant process of adjusting-and-readjusting, give-and-take forms the cutting edge of the 
channel evolution.  
 
This process may be different in emerging economies (e.g., India) compared to the 
developed economy (e.g., USA), because the channel evolution has a larger gap to 
overcome in the former. The channel evolution process in emerging economies is dynamic 
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and complex. Martinsons (2008) alludes to these differences while discussing electronic 
markets in China. Further, we do not believe the channels evolve and work similarly in all 
emerging economies, partly because the institutional environments are not always 
comparable. The Indian economy presents an interesting mix of free market and socialism, 
rising modernism and resurging religious fervor, and both political will and opposition for 
market reforms. All of these conflicting and complementing dynamics make for an 
interesting research agenda for scholars interested in understanding the channels in 
emerging economies in general and India in particular.   
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Table 1: Uncertainty Reduction in Transactions through Contract Enforcement 
 
 Type of Contract 
Enforcement 
Means of 
Enforcement 
Examples Remarks 
1 First Party Self declaration that 
“I will act morally” 
A personal oath Relies on a discretion of 
an individual 
2 Second Party Retaliation Threat of 
violence 
Law is bypassed 
3 Third Party 
(informal) 
Societal sanctions Threat of making 
one an outcast 
Higher transaction cost 
as many individuals are 
involved 
4 Third party 
(formal) 
Legal court Legal penalty Could be costly but is 
efficient and scalable 
 
 
